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It has been five hundred years since the term utopia was coined; and in that time it has been widely (mis)read, (ab)used, and distorted. This is no bad thing in and of itself, for meanings change over time; and as Ernst Bloch notes, "To limit the utopian to the Thomas More variety, or simply to try to orientate it in that direction, would be like trying to reduce electricity to the amber from which it gets its Greek name and in which it was first noticed. Indeed, the utopian coincides so little with the novel of the ideal state that the whole totality of philosophy becomes necessary . . . to do justice to the content of that designated by utopia." 1 Nonetheless, I often find myself dissatisfied with particular applications of utopia: not only colloquially but also in contemporary utopian studies, in which place-one of utopia's three constituent terms-is often sidelined, leaving utopia as a function of thought or a temporal process. 2 Here, I propose to pay "subversive fidelity" to More's term by considering how we might conceive of "place," along with utopia's other two constituent terms: good and no. I consider how these concepts might function and how they might be thought together to rethink utopia. (Un)fortunately, I do not have the "whole totality of philosophy" at my disposal, but I offer an understanding of place inspired by recent geographic theory; draw on Deleuze's reading of Spinoza to develop an "ethical," affective account of "the good"; and turn to Sara Ahmed's critique of happiness to theorize "the no." These approaches are brought together to develop a particular understanding of utopia as a place constituted by particular affective relations ("affective utopia"), which is developed through a reading of Anarres, as described in Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed (although ultimately I argue that Anarres probably cannot be thought of as an affective utopia). This provides some "flesh" on the bones of theory while showing how a theory of affective utopianism can be used to read spatial practice. Thinking through The Dispossessed's subtitle ("An Ambiguous Utopia"), meanwhile, allows me to show how affective utopia is a doubly ambiguous form: once at the level of its constitution, once at the level of judgment.
The affective theory of utopia developed can be read both methodologically and normatively. It does not offer an analysis of a particular historical tendency or attempt to create a general working definition of utopia (although this is not to say that it is entirely divorced from "fictional" and "real" spatial practice: indeed, it is heavily informed by them). It offers a form of utopianism I think it would be productive to adopt in struggle; and while I do not believe that any form of utopia(nism) could be politically sufficient in and of itself, it is an approach I favor and is an approach that can be used to read particular places, whether "real" or "fictional." This does not have to be to the exclusion of other theoretical approaches, which I draw on in the final section of this essay to argue that some of Anarres's failings cannot be separated from the silences and inconsistencies in Le Guin's narrative.
Place
My insistence on the importance of place for utopia is motivated by pragmatism rather than etymological pedantry, for it is place that provides utopia's conceptual specificity. While all concepts of "the good" implicitly point to (even if they deny) a "good place," it is possible to engage in a discussion of "the good" without making explicit reference to the places that result from or prefigure it. Negativity, meanwhile, is often positioned against place. 3 The conceptual power of utopia stems from the fact that it thinks both "the good" and "the no" in terms of the "real" or "imaginary" places that these concepts might produce. Yet place is rarely paid explicit attention in utopian studies. David Harvey's Spaces of Hope argues for place as a part of utopianism but does not consider its function as a constituent part of utopia in any depth. 4 Where there is engagement with what might be called "places" in utopian studies, their internal operations are often sidelined; and there is no reflection on precisely what the concept "place" does for the concept "utopia." Here, I outline three reasons for this: (1) a privileging of utopia's function over its content, (2) the use of the term utopia to refer to a method, and (3) a privileging of the temporal over the spatial.
Perhaps as a result of the strength of literary approaches in utopian studies, utopia is often approached hermeneutically: the main object of study is the function of utopia-as-text. This approach has both negative and positive modes: The former privileges "estrangement," with utopian texts held to unpick readers' certainty about the finitude or necessity of the present; 5 while the latter focuses on how utopian texts "educate desire" for a world other than that which exists. 6 For some, these functions can be separated from the precise content of a given text or are strengthened by the failure of the text to satisfy or convince. As Ruth Levitas writes, summarizing Miguel Abensour, "The point is not whether one agrees or disagrees with the institutional arrangements, but rather that the utopian experiment disrupts the taken-forgranted nature of the present."
7 Fredric Jameson, meanwhile, argues that the failure of the utopian text to escape the conditions of its production provides utopia with its estranging power (best understood, he says, as an "antianti-utopianism"). 8 In contrast, Tom Moylan offers detailed descriptions of the "critical" utopian societies in four novels (including The Dispossessed) and argues that their complexity means that they are likely to have a more profoundly estranging effect on their readers. 9 Similarly, John P. Clark argues that "the most powerful utopian works are also profoundly topian-they create a vivid sense of place grounded in deeply experienced realities"; 10 while Levitas states that close engagement with the content of a utopian text is required in order for its affirmative potential to be realized and argues that this potential is greatest when the text presents an alternative society in considerable detail. Here, then, we find that the place described by a utopian text is of importance, but the primary focus remains on the relationship between the text and its reader, rather than on the content of the text (i.e., the qualities of the place) itself. The method, function, or operation of utopia is privileged over a consideration of utopia-as-place.
11 This is, of course, extremely useful-and can be utilized alongside the method I develop here-but its dominance in the field perhaps obscures other ways of approaching utopia. This is particularly the case when the approach is developed such that the utopian method/function/operation is named "utopia." This semantic shift is the second way in which utopia-as-place is obscured in utopian studies. Here, rather than "utopia" functioning as a place that inspires estrangement and/or the education of desire, it describes the reading of utopian texts and the effect this has on readers. Darko Suvin refers to utopia as "a method rather than a state" and so something that "cannot be realized or not realized-it can only be applied"; 12 while Jameson describes utopia as "an operation calculated to disclose the limits of our own imagination of the future" (at times conflating this with his "anti-anti-utopianism"). 13 For Ruth Levitas, utopia constitutes an "imaginary reconstitution of society" and includes the act of writing-as well as reading-the utopian text.
While I do not deny that there are operations, functions, and methods of utopia (both estranging and affirmative), I do not accept the claim that these are utopia. Referring to them as such leaves no term for the places that catalyze this operation, collapses utopia into radical or critical thought more broadly, and leaves analysts in the awkward position of having to make clear every time they use the term utopia whether they are naming the textual "good place" that catalyzes a process of thought or the process itself.
The final manner in which place is sidelined in utopian studies is the positioning of utopia as a temporal-rather than spatial-phenomenon. Here, the focus is on those who experience or produce utopia directly rather than those who encounter it textually. Ernst Bloch's The Principle of Hope, for example, positions utopia as a temporal force immanent in a number of "everyday" activities, expressing an immanent collective desire for a state of abundance and fulfillment that has not yet arrived (which he names Heimat or the Ultimum).
14 This expands the scope of utopia but does not help us to address how utopia-as-place might function, and the temporal tendency Bloch names utopia would be better referred to as utopianism or "the utopian." This is the approach recommended (although inconsistently applied) by Angelika Bammer, who brings Bloch into dialogue with a utopian trend in 1970s feminism and argues for the replacement of "'a utopia' as something fixed . . . with the idea of 'the utopian' as an approach toward." 15 Yet, if utopia is no longer a category we can use, what is this an approach toward?
Moving away from this Blochian teleology, a number of feminist, anarchist, and autonomist approaches to utopia have implicitly or explicitly favored the temporal aspects of utopia over the spatial. Lucy Sargisson articulates a feminist utopianism that "constantly affirm[s] play, process and dynamism" but does not explicitly articulate how this produces place; 16 while Lisa Garforth figures Deleuze and Guattari's "lines of flight" as a utopian gesture but does not explore the places these might produce. 17 Valérie Fournier uses "utopianism rather than 'utopia' to emphasize movement over static visions of a better order," 18 a move referenced (and implicitly adopted) by Ruth Kinna. 19 Judith Suissa outlines an "anarchist utopianism" in her analysis of anarchist schools-which are explicitly figured as "spaces"-but does not call these utopias and is hostile to the term. 20 Similarly, Andy Robinson and Simon Tormey argue that "at the most basic level, utopia is not a particular space or place but a movement or flow which in turn may create new spatial possibilities." 21 What, then, do we call these spaces or spatial possibilities? Others are closer to the position I adopt below and refer to them as utopias. Harvey argues for a "spatiotemporal utopianism" that seeks to dialectically unify Blochian "utopias of process" and spatialized "social utopias." This dialectical back-and-forth sees space and time as distinct (even opposing) forms, however, with time associated with process and place associated with closure: the approach I take below sees them as inherently interconnected. Laurence Davis writes of the prefigurative "grounded utopias" generated by social movements, with the term grounded emphasizing both their spatial nature and the fact that they are immanent rather than transcendent. 22 Uri Gordon argues that "anarchist utopias are . . . places created by the actions of individuals and communities taking history into their own hands"; 23 and Carissa Honeywell identifies an anarchist utopianism in the work of thinkers such as Paul Goodman and Colin Ward, which is spatially present "beneath" society. 24 With the exception of Harvey, however, these thinkers do not reflect on precisely what "place" means or how it might function in "utopia." It is to this task that I now turn. Place is, of course, closely related to space-a concept treated with suspicion in radical thought, in which it is often understood as an ahistorical form constituted of either inertia or chaos. 25 Place fares even worse, frequently understood as space imbued with a fixed, essential, and authentic identity. 26 Attempts to create "good places," then, have been seen as attempts to create oases cut off from material dynamics of social change (when really it is time that will redeem us) and/or as the once-and-for-all establishment of authoritarian perfectionism-the top-down application of a predetermined vision of "the good" on a supposedly inert or chaotic volume of space (and its inhabitants).
While there are utopian studies scholars who position utopia as a perfect, hierarchical place, 27 and utopia can function as an oasis cut off from historical operations of power, insisting on the "topos" of utopia does not necessitate such a philosophy. Rather, it is possible to turn to approaches that see space (re)produced through the changing relations of bodies and (re)producing these bodies. 28 Following Karen Barad, I frame these relations as "intra-actions" rather than "interactions," in order to stress that the bodies do not preexist this coming together but are produced through it. 29 In thinking how these intra-actions produce space, the focus shifts from "enumerating" space by describing what occurs in it to describing the becomings that (re)produce it. 30 These becomings will be of a particular character, of course, shaped by any number of factors, and so "place" can be taken to refer to "particular articulations" of spatial relations, as Doreen Massey argues. "If space is . . . a simultaneity of stories-so-far," she writes, "then places are collections of those stories, articulations within the wider powergeometries of space. Their character will be a product of those intersections within that wider setting, and what is made of them. And, too, of the non-meetings-up, the disconnections and the relations not established, the exclusions." 31 This can be illustrated with reference to Anarres, the "anarchist" moon of the planet Urras (a fictional surrogate for 1970s Earth, from which Anarres's founders emigrated a couple hundred years before the action in the novel), 32 on which much of Ursula (K.) Le Guin's 1974 novel The Dispossessed is set (the remainder is set on Urras or in transit between the two worlds). Anarres is itself a major actor in the novel, 33 making The Dispossessed one of the "profoundly topian" novels that Clark references and suitable for analysis through the lens of place (though I note below that it is important to step back and provide a more textual analysis as well). 34 Implicitly referencing understandings of place critiqued above, Jennifer Rodgers argues that Anarres provides "a working model for utopia as evolution-not a place, but a process of becoming," 35 but Davis disagrees, noting that it is animated by "a generous Spirit of Place." 36 This "spirit" can most clearly be identified in the understanding of place shown by Shevek, the novel's main character, and resonates with the alternative approach outlined above. Socialized by Anarres's "Odonian" ideology-and inspired by his research in temporal physics-Shevek believes (with echoes of Heraclitus) that "you shall not go down twice to the same river. Nor can you go home again." Yet he rejects a straightforward privileging of becoming over place (or even their separation), adding: "What is most changeable is shown to be fullest of eternity, and your relationship to the river, and the river's relationship to you and to itself, turns out to be at once more complex and more reassuring than a mere lack of identity. You can go home again . . . so long as you understand that home is a place where you have never been." 37 This invocation of place-in-becoming resonates with (half-forgotten) Odonian ontology, which states that "to be whole is to be part; true voyage is return."
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Extrapolating from Massey's definition of place, it can be said that to call a place a utopia means privileging particular connections and exclusions and framing these through the "ambiguous consistency" of the "good" and the "no." Such an editorial role requires responsibility; and judgment about whether a place is or is not utopia (or even is a dystopia) can only ever be provisional, partial, and situated. This, then, is the double ambiguity of utopia that I referred to earlier: it is constituted by ambiguity, and labeling a place "utopia" is always an ambiguous task. 39 Before either of these ambiguities can be shown in action, however, an account of the concept of the "good" is necessary.
The "Good" Lyman Tower Sargent argues that "perfect, perfection, and their variants are freely used by scholars in defining utopias. They should not be." 40 Normatively speaking, I agree. Yet an empirico-historical approach to the concept of utopia must include such understandings because-whether or not they are understood by their authors, founders, or inhabitants as perfect places-the history of utopia contains a number of (fictional and real) places to which perfection is ascribed. 41 Such places are oriented toward a particular understanding of "the good" that-once realized-is held to remove the need for further change.
It is my contention that such places would not be "good" to inhabit and that this understanding of the good is hostile to the understanding of place outlined above. 42 To avoid this, I turn to Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, from whom he draws a distinction between morality and ethics: the former as a system of thought seeking to fix life around a predetermined vision of the good, the latter as an "affective" approach where the good emerges immanently. 43 A useful starting point here is Deleuze's definition of the ethical good and bad as two senses of the variation of the power of acting: the decrease of this power (sadness) is bad; its increase (joy) is good. . . . Objectively, then, everything that increases or enhances our power of acting is good, and that which diminishes or restrains it is bad; and we only know good and bad through the feeling of joy or sadness of which we are conscious. . . . Since the power of acting is what opens the capacity for being affected to the greatest number of things, a thing is good "which so disposes the body that it can be affected in a greater number of ways." 44 It is this "ethical" concept of the good that forms a constitutive feature of the utopianism I outline here.
Before going further, it is important to unpack two (related) points, which challenge any necessary opposition between the individual and the collective. First, "body" does not simply refer to the physical dimensions of the individual subject. Rather, it relates to a "dynamic ensemble of relations . . . defined by its affective capacity." 45 A building, then, may be a body, as may a piece of technology, a crowd, a single human being, or a place. Changes to a body's affective capacity occur through intra-actions "below," " alongside," or "above" the body. Thus, I avoid the term individual (except as a critical category) in favor of Lewis Hyde's use of the term dividual: figures " constituted by the complexity of the world around" them.
This leads me on to the second point I wish to make about this understanding of the body: that an increase in or enhancement of a body's power to act also increases its power to be acted upon (and vice versa). Good relations of power are mutual: the increase of one dividual's power increases the power of other dividuals to act-and thus of the collective to act. Starhawk emphasizes this by referring to "power-with," a term useful for decentering individualism. 47 This is a form of nonhierarchy, with power held and produced in common; and it produces considerable freedom, understood as "the possibility of something new and truly different coming about." 48 This "new" does not emerge at a pregiven moment but, rather, at times of "singularity," akin to the bifurcation of a curve, 49 troubling the understanding of time as a homogeneous, irreversible succession of moments. 50 This, I maintain, is a communist politics: communist in the sense that power is held in common (and this must necessarily include goods and land) and in the sense of being "the real movement which abolishes the present state of things." 51 Anarres is (in part) (re)produced through this "good." Property and land are held in common, but this is far from the communism of liberal fantasy: Le Guin explicitly notes that the Anarresti retain their (in)dividuality. 52 Strength is understood to come through power-with: having been told that "the law of evolution is that the strongest survives," Shevek replies by saying, "Yes, and the strongest, in the existence of any social animal, are those who are most social. In human terms, the most ethical." 53 To be ethically good is to work with others for the mutual increase of affective capacities; and being open to the affective encounter is an ethical imperative, for "to lock out is to lock in." 54 This communal strength ("power-with") is also figured as a freedomin-common: "It's your nature to be Tirin," says Shevek to a friend, "and my nature to be Shevek, and our common nature to be Odonians, responsible to one another. And that responsibility is our freedom. To avoid it, would be to lose our freedom." 55 Pravic, the language spoken on Anarres, also plays a role in reproducing these good power relations and is so successful that Shevek struggles to understand the Urrasti concepts of "superiority and inferiority." The "No"
Thus far, Anarres appears straightforwardly utopian. But we cannot abandon Anarres (or utopia) here-we only have "the good place." There is no ambiguity: attention must be paid to the "no." One way to do this would be to note that such "good places" could never exist in reality because of the inevitability of relationships of domination emerging, even where there is no formal hierarchy. 57 Domination is ethically "bad" as it reduces the ability of bodies to affect and be affected. It is a "disaffecting" 58 force that reproduces any given place as a dystopia ("bad place"). 59 Domination on Anarres is illustrated through Shevek's relationship with Sabul, his senior university colleague. Given Anarres's supposed nonhierarchy, seniority should be strictly a matter of age, but it is obvious to the reader (and eventually Shevek) that Sabul informally dominates Shevek. While Shevek wants the "ansible" he is developing (a device for instantaneous communication between any two points in space) to be available for the common good, Sabul wishes to appropriate it for private gain. He behaves, in other words, as an individual. 60 Shevek's faith in Anarres-asutopia thus becomes dangerous, for it allows Sabul's domination to pass unnoticed. Utopia-as-place is separated from the processes of utopianism needed to constantly (re)produce it. While a hierarchical distribution of power (at least one with any sense of permanence) is incompatible with utopianism as described here, it is not enough to believe that nonhierarchical organization automatically and permanently creates a utopia: "tyrannies of habit" 61 ossify social relations and prevent new becomings, limiting freedom. As the Urrasti Vea points out to Shevek, in some respects it might be better to have a formal hierarchy-at least then your enemy is visible. 62 Indeed, Sabul exploits the invisibility of domination-and Shevek's faith in Anarres-as-utopia-by claiming that "this isn't some kind of hierarchy" in an attempt to prevent Shevek challenging his power. 63 While Pravic may enable the Anarresti to reproduce the good more easily because hierarchy is unthinkable, it also prevents them from recognizing domination when it occurs. Domination and "locking out" are not only internal to Anarres: they also mark its relationship with Urras. The Dispossessed opens on Anarres with a description of "a wall" that "did not look important." Despite its modesty, the wall is a border: it functions to keep out Urrasti residents and so prevents intra-actions that might threaten the social order (as with all borders, it is reinforced by xenophobia). 64 This attempt to keep Urras separate is in part designed to prevent statist behaviors from Urras from disrupting the functioning of Anarres; yet it ends up contributing to Anarres's ossification and brings to mind more obviously authoritarian "walled" utopias such as the City of the Sun described by Campanella. 65 It is tempting to say, then, that utopia is "no place" because it is impossible to realize. The very techniques the Anarresti have developed to create a utopia have resulted in its ossification toward dystopia. 66 Yet this argument smacks of the liberal defeatism in which any attempt to realize a utopia necessarily results in a dystopia (a move that proclaims our own world as utopian as it disavows the utopian). I want to suggest that "ambiguously" bringing the "no" and the "good" together such that they obtain a consistency enables us to see utopia as a possibility. To do this, I want to focus on the role of Shevek's friend Bedap, who notices Sabul's domination, links it to broader operations of power on Anarres, and tries to make Shevek aware of it. Initially, Shevek rejects him and repeats his faith in Anarres-as-utopia:
"What are you talking about, Dap? We have no power structure." "No? What makes Sabul so strong?" "Not a power structure, a government. . . ." "No. We have no government, no laws, all right. But as far as I can see, ideas never were controlled by laws and governments. . . . You can't crush ideas by suppressing them. You can only crush them by ignoring them. By refusing to think-refusing to change. And that's precisely what our society is doing! Sabul uses you where he can, and where he can't, he prevents you from publishing, from teaching, even from working. Right? In other words, he has power over you. Where does he get it from? Not from vested authority, there isn't any. Not from intellectual excellence, he hasn't any. He gets it from the innate cowardice of the average human mind. Public opinion! That's the power structure he's part of, and knows how to use. The unadmitted, inadmissible government that rules the Odonian society by stifling the individual mind." 67 Bedap explicitly figures these operations of power as an example of "disaffection," asking Shevek if he has ever thought about "what the analogic mode calls 'disease,' social disaffection, discontent, alienation, that this might analogically also be called pain-what you meant when you talked about pain, suffering? And that, like pain, it serves a function in the organism?" 68 Here, Bedap moves toward figuring Anarres as a dystopia. Yet, by turning to the work of Sara Ahmed and reading Bedap as "affect alien," 69 it is possible to see this articulation of disaffection as a utopian moment. Here we arrive at the second way in which utopia is ambiguous.
The "affect alien" is the dividual who does not "correctly" perform happy affect. "Maintaining public comfort"-the unambiguous celebration of Anarres-as-utopia, in this case-requires them to "'go along with it,' to agree to where [they] are placed," because "to refuse to be placed would mean to be seen as trouble, as causing discomfort for others." Thus, "there is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what feelings to whom." 70 Affect aliens are disempowered: their ability to participate in the intra-actions that create place is reduced. Should they attempt to articulate their negative feelings, it is they who are identified as (and blamed for being) the source of this negativity. 71 Thus, Shevek resents Bedap's articulations of domination on Anarres, even reacting "violently" to his arguments. 72 Ahmed, however, argues that the "badness" may well emanate from the supposed "good place" (though she talks about "objects," rather than places per se).
Yet Anarresti could (ambiguously) reproduce Anarres-as-utopia by not "presum[ing] bad feelings are backward and conservative and good feelings are forward and progressive" and not seeing bad feelings as "oriented to the past, as a kind of stubbornness that 'stops' the subject from embracing the future." 73 Rather, the articulation of Anarres's "badness" should be understood as potentially productive: the estranging "no" of the affect alien can open space for freedom-"To share what deviates from happiness is to open up possibility, to be alive to possibility." 74 Indeed, eventually Shevek is prepared to receive Bedap's "bad feelings," and these play an important role in persuading him to travel to Urras, where he has the breakthrough that allows him to create the "ansible" and is inspired to organize for change on Anarres by Urrasti anticolonial activists. Bedap and Shevek's "no" to Anarres thus opens up new intra-actions: they come into a productively ambiguous relationship with the "good" and-ultimately-help increase the capacity of bodies across the universe to affect and be affected by each other, 75 enhancing both intensive and extensive power-with.
This "no" is, then, ambiguously consistent with the understanding of the "good" developed above and attests to the importance of seeing those "who refuse to let go of suffering, who are even prepared to kill some forms of joy" as "an alternative model of the social good": what Clark refers to as a "discordant harmony."
76 Sometimes the joyful "yes" of good intra-actions may be the driving force of utopianism; sometimes it may be the act of saying "no" to actions that hinder such intra-actions. David Eden's argument is pertinent here. For him, we should not "create a paradigm that sees some kind of split between 'Noes' and 'Yeses.' Rather . . . our attempts to fundamentally change social relations always have these elements bound up within each other. It is an error to argue that one must precede the other." 77 The good and the no, in other words, can work together to (re)produce "the good place that is no place."
This utopianism does not progress "from one point to another"-as in Oscar Wilde's famous claim that humanity sees a better country (utopia) and then sets sail for it 78 -but is "perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival." 79 Thus, as has hopefully become clear, this utopianism (as a temporal organizing force) is not oriented to a utopian blueprint (though utopian visions may play a heuristic role in affective utopianism). Rather, it produces utopias (as places); and these places beget further utopianism (to the extent that they do not ossify toward dystopia). Utopianism's temporality and utopia's spatiality are mixed together and cannot be separated as they are in Wilde's analogy of voyage and arrival. This resonates with contemporary arguments in geography and physics that state that space and time cannot be fully separated. 80 The affective utopia is thus prefigurative, but it is not prefigurative of a final form; rather-to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari on immanence-it is "prefigurative only to itself." 81 It is this sense of impermanence that-the reader hopes-Shevek and the revolutionary syndicate will reintroduce to Anarres.
Anarres's Silences and Inconsistencies
There remain, however, a number of relations of domination on Anarres that it seems Shevek and the syndicate will not challenge, because they seem entirely unaware of their existence. Here, perhaps, it becomes difficult to separate these characters' ignorance of these relationships of domination from Le Guin's; and it is important to remember Levitas's claim that readers must attend to the "silences and inconsistencies" of utopias-to their absences as well as their presences. 82 Where these places are represented fictionally their silences and inconsistencies are likely to reflect the author's prejudices or inconsistencies (which will, of course, also tell us about the social conditions in which they were produced). Thus, the place-based approach to utopia I develop here is inadequate unless utilized alongside more text-centric approaches to utopia. This is particularly the case when the place in question is fictional, but even where the place exists any articulation of it will always be partial and creative and thus open to various forms of textual analysis.
Despite Le Guin's undoubted commitment to anarchism and emancipation from patriarchy and oppression, Anarres and the narrative structure of The Dispossessed are marked by a number of "silences and inconsistencies." Samuel Delany and Tom Moylan have pointed to the persistence of the heteronormative nuclear family as a dominant and seemingly unchallenged form of social reproduction on Anarres (albeit with tolerance of bisexual polyamory, at least for men), despite the clear limits this places on the ability of women and queer and gender-nonconforming subjects to increase their affective capacities, and to specific instances of sexism both on Anarres and in Le Guin's narrative. 83 These patriarchal elements (of both Shevek and the narrative) become particularly apparent through the description of a serious sexual assault Shevek commits on Urras (at a party he ejaculateswithout permission-on Vea's dress). 84 While such an event could function as a clear warning against unambiguously celebrating Shevek as a hero, the narrative around it serves largely as an indictment of Urrasti culture rather than calling into question the extent to which misogyny on Anarres might have been responsible. This means that Shevek is never made to come to terms with his abuse, and the episode can even be read as humanizing him, exacerbating the misfortune in Le Guin choosing a handsome male to be her "affect alien." 85 After all, Ahmed's affect aliens occupy positions of structural disadvantage in society: Shevek-however individually frustrated he may be-does not. Anarres has seemingly done away with white supremacy (or perhaps it was never an issue, though this seems unlikely given the colonial dynamics on Urras, and Le Guin can certainly be criticized for not tackling this 86 ), but patriarchy remains; and there is nothing to suggest that Shevek and his comrades recognize this. Furthermore, Shevek is frequently figured-by Le Guin, by other Anarresti, and by himself-as an individual enacting power-to rather than a dividual dependent upon those around him for power-with. As quoted above, Bedap, for example, associates Shevek's "individual mind" with change (and identifies "the public" as the force preventing change); while Shevek speaks of his "own initiative" as "the only initiative I acknowledge" 87 when explaining why he traveled to Urras (he was actually persuaded to travel by his wife, Takver, and through his numerous intra-actions with Bedap).
This individualism is not simply a property of Anarres but is frequently repeated through Le Guin's narrative, which displays a tendency to privilege the individual over the collective rather than show them in a mutual intra-action. We never see the operation of Shevek's revolutionary syndicate, for example, 88 although we are shown Shevek's involvement in collective struggle on Urras, with the suggestion that this informs his actions on Anarres. Bedap, meanwhile, appears only occasionally (to "alienate" Shevek) before being rather brutally dispensed with: his "affect alienation" is thoroughly instrumentalized-we never learn whether his capacity to affect or be affected is increased. All of this means that Anarres and The Dispossessed at times repeat liberal-patriarchal tropes and serves as a reminder of the importance of Jameson's argument that utopian texts never fully escape the conditions of their production.
The question still remains, however: Is Anarres an affective utopia? Any answer to this question can only ever be provisional: despite enjoying a broader view than any single Anarresti citizen, readers remain reliant on Le Guin to guide them, and there are many things they are not shown. (This returns us to Massey's definition of places as collections of stories about a particular space: What stories are we not told? How might the place of Anarres be different if someone other than Le Guin "collected" these stories or if Le Guin had "collected" these stories later in her life, when her views of gendered inequality had changed?) Thus, we return to the first aspect of Anarres's-and affective utopianism's-double ambiguity. Anarres's status as a utopia is ambiguous (a fact complicated by its necessarily partial narration by Le Guin); and if it is a utopia, it is one constituted by the ambiguous intra-action of the good and the no. I am inclined to say that Anarres is not an affective utopia-or at least that it is not one at any point (in space and time) during the narrative of The Dispossessed: not because bad intra-actions remain prominent in its social ordering but because they remain unchallenged. In this sense, I am inclined to agree with Tony Burns that The Dispossessed is best read as a novel about utopianism rather than one depicting a utopia (though my reasoning differs greatly from Burns's). 89 Anarres is certainly a place, and much of it is good; but it needs more affect aliens to organize around their disaffected alienation and challenge that which is bad if it is to become an affective utopia.
A different telling of Anarres may provide us with this, however, but we can never fully separate any place from its creation through narrative.
Nonetheless, engaging actively with Anarres does provide the reader with an understanding of how utopia as developed in this article might function. As such, The Dispossessed remains a very useful book about utopianism. We see that places can be constituted through immanent intra-actions and that it is possible for places to produce and be (re)produced by this power-with. In other words, by temporally and conceptually reading beyond the limits of the text (by imagining what happens once the novel leaves Anarres and by applying perspectives or knowledges absent from the narrative) we can imagine how Anarres might become a utopia in the future.
90

Conclusion
Through an engagement with a variety of political, social, and geographic theory, and with the society of Anarres as depicted in Ursula Le Guin's The Dispossessed, this article has rethought utopia as "the good place that is no place." It has drawn on understandings of place as a dynamic form constituted in time through the intra-action of bodies. It has suggested that these intraactions are "good" when they nonhierarchically produce affective power-with and that this "good" can be "ambiguously" enhanced by the articulation of oppressive relations of domination. Nonetheless, I have argued that we can only ever ambiguously assert whether any given place constitutes such a utopia, for information about power relations is necessarily partial and situated, even when we are "reading" a place from its outside (as I did with Anarres). I have also posited a relationship between utopianism and utopia in which the former produces the latter affectively (and is then reproduced by it), rather than being oriented to a predetermined ideal vision. This takes us a long way from More's Utopia of 1516. And yet, at the same time it does not. Places change; and concepts change. We can go back to utopia, so long as we understand that utopia is a place we have never been. david m. bell is the network coordinator and a research associate for the Imaginaries of the Future network, based in the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape at Newcastle University. He is the author of Rethinking Utopia: Place, Power, Affect (Routledge, forthcoming).
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